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Abstmcl-Effectivc mitigation of denial of service (DoS)
~bsrr~cr-Effective
(DoS) attack is a pressing problem on the Internet.
Internet- In many instimces,
instances, DoS attacks can be prePrevented if the spoofed source IP
I P address is traced back to its origin which
allows assigning penalties to the offending party or
o r isolating the compromised hosts and domains from the rest of the network. Recently IP traceback mechanisms based on probabilistic packet marking (PPM)
(PPM) have been
proposed for achieving traceback of DoS attacks. In this paper, we show
that prohabilistic
marking-of interest due to its efficiency and improbabilistic packet marking-of
plementability vis-a-vis
plementability
vis-a-vis deterministic packet marking and logging or messaging based schemes-suffers
schemes-suffers under spoofing of the marking field in the IP
IP
header by the attacker which can impede traceback by the victim. We show
that there is a trade-off
trade-off between the ability of the victim to localize the atattacker and the severity of tlle
the DoS attack,
attack. which is represented as
a s a function
of the marking probability, path
pat11 length, and traffic \'olume.
volume. The optimal dedecision problem-the
can choose
clloose the marking probability whereas the
problem-the victim.
victim-can
attacker can choose the spoofed marking value, source address, and attack
volume-can be expressed as a constrained minimax
pmblem,
volume-can
miuimax optimization problem,
where the victim chooses the marking probability such that the number of
forgeable attack paths is minimized. We show that the attacker's
attacker's ability to
hide his location is curtailed by increasing the marking probability,
probability, ho\r3however, the latter is upper-bounded due to sampling constraints. In typical
IP
IF' internets, the attacker's
attacker's address can be localized to within 2--5
2-5 equally
likely sites which renders PPM
P P M effective
effcctive against single source attacks. Under distributed DoS attacks, the uncertainty achievable by the attacker can
be amplified, which diminishes the effectiveness of PPM.
KeywordsKey11:or-(Is- Probabilistic packet marking,
nlarking, Denial of service attack,
Traceback analysis, Network secnrity,
security, IP
I P spoofing

L INTRODUCTION
A. Background

Denial of service (DoS) is a pressing problem on the Internet as evidenced by recent attacks on commercial servers and
ISPs and their consequent disruption of services [2].
[2]. DoS attacks [3],
[3], [4], [5].
[ 5 ] ,[6].
[611 [7], [8]
[8] consume resources associated
elements-e.g.: Web servers, routers, firefirewith various network elements-e.g.,
walls, and end hosts-which
walls:
hosts-which impedes the efficient functioning
and provisioning of services in accordance with their intended
purpose. Their impact is more pronounced than network congestion due to the concentrated and targeted nature of resource
depletion and clogging,
clogging, which not only impacts quality of service (QoS)
hut can affect the very availability of services. Sus(QoS) but
ceptibility to DoS is an intrinsic problem
probleln of any service provisioning system-albeit
systen1-albeit amplified in the networked digital enviThis work
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ronment due to speed and automation-where.
autonlation-where. at a minimum,
minimum:
the occurrence of a potentially valid event (e.g.,
(e.2.: service request,
TCP SYN packet) must be processed to ascertain its validity.
Even though the resource expenditure associated with processing a single event may be negligible, when this is multiplied
by the large factors
factors enabled by the high bandwidth of modern
networks, its impact can be significant no matter how
broadband networks;
small the individual processing overhead. Firewalls and filters
filters
running at gateway routers can shield a network system from
froin
outside DoS flows, but if their function includes selectively admitting valid client flows resident outside a guarded domain,
then this very filtering service can be impeded by DoS attacks
targeted at the gateway. As with prank telephone caHs
calls or ringing of door bells in days gone by, an effective means of preventing DoS attacks from occurring
occurrinp in the first place-also
dace-also the
only fundamental solution given the intrinsic susceptibility of
service provisioning systems to DoS-lies
DoS-lies in identification of
the attacker which admits assigning commensurate costs (e.g.,
(e.~.:
legal or economical)
econonlical) to the perpetrating entity. Even if the atcompro~nisedhosts intruded by an attack was instituted from compromised
tacker. if the physical source of DoS traffic can be identified,
then at the very least the invaded network element can be isolated or shut down, and in some instances,
instances. the attacker's identity
can be further traced back by state information available on the
compromised system.
system. In this paper, we address the source identification problem and analyze its properties from a probabilistic packet marking approach, motivated by its appealing feature
with respect to efficiency and implementability.
implementability.

-

-

for Plabobilisric
Probabilistic Pocket
Packet Morkbag
Marking
B. A Case
Cose.for-

A "simple" way of identifying the physical source of DoS
hy elimination of IP address spoofing.
traffic is by
spoofing. If all ISPs
mechanisms for preventing IP source address
were to implement
in~plementniechanis~ns
spoofing-which
spoofing-which is,
ist technically, easy to do-then
do-then source identification (also called IP traceback in [9]),
[9]). would be solved. A less
drastic measure,
nieasure, based on packet marking, would allow spoofed
packets to pass through, however, with the corrected source IP
address overwriting the spoofed source IP address.
address. For various
practical reasons,
reasons: this may be difficult to achieve or require a
prolonged period to be broadly deployed on the Internet. Thus,
prolonped
Thus:
there is a need for incrementally deployahle
deployable techniques that may
not completely
conlpletely eliminate the DoS problem, but reduce it to a
"manageable"
"manageable" level.
A number of recent works have studied the problem of trac-

ing the physical source of a DoS attack [6],
[61, [9],
[9]: [10],
[lo]; [I
[I I],
I]. [12],
[l2],
packet marking
[13],
1131, [l4].
[I 41. In detenninistic
cierer7ni17isticpacker
rnnrkirlg [IS],
[I 51, the source of
a traffic flow is recovered by employing tracing information inscribed in the packet. Packet marking can be viewed as a form
of "stateless logging"
logging" which emulates the capability of path recovery by router based information logging [12],
[l2], [14],
[14]: without
incurring
incuning the latter's statefulness and associated space overhead.
A related method is messaging based path recovery [10]
[I 01 which
uses control messages emitted from routers conveying path information to destination nodes. Thus (router) statelessness is
achieved, however,
however: at the cost of message overhead. Packet
marking-and,
messaging-follows the end-tomarking-and, to some extent, messaging-follows
end-toend paradigm [ 16]
161 where complexity of path recovery is pushed
to the edge while imposing a minimal footprint on per-hop network support requirements.
reqrlirenients.
A significant drawback of deterministic packet marking
(DPM) is the increasing packet header size requirement which
grows linearly with hop count.
count. In addition to amplifying packet
size-a
size-a form of communication complexity--dynamically
complexity4ynamically variable packet sizes complicate
con~plicaterouter processing which can impart
nontrivial overhead to achieving terabit-per-second switching
probabilistic packer
packet marking [9],
speeds. In probobilisric
[9], each router probabilistically inscribes its local path information onto a traversing packet so that the destination node (i.e., victim
victiin of an attack)
can reconstruct,
coniplete path trareconstruct, with high probability, the complete
versed by inspecting the markings on the received packets, assuming the attack volume is sufficiently high. This corresponds
to probabilistically "sampling"
"sampling" the route undertaken by an attack using constant
corlstnrzr space in the packet header independent of
hop count,
count: which provides the key advantage over deterministic
packet marking. In probabilistic
probabilistic marking, when a router dep, it
cides to mark based on a coin toss with marking probability p.
overwrites the information contained in the marking field,
field: thus
erasing any possible markings by upstream routers. Thus,
Thus. for
PPM to work, it is necessary that p < 1.
1. By the same token,
token.
with some positive probability, a packet will arrive at the destibeen
nation without
ith hour having
l~nvir~g
beerz marked
rnnrked by any of
of the
rhe intermediate
irzrer-rnediore
routers.
rorrrers. This reveals--above
reveals--above and beyond the need for requiring
a set of packets to recover the attack path-a
path-a potentially serious
weakness of PPM since the marking field may contain a value,
inscribed by the attacker, whose aim is to confuse or impede the
victim's ability to traceback. In this paper, we give a comprecomprefield problem.
problem.
hensive treatment of the spoofed marking
rnarkingJield
C.
C. New Contributions
Corirriblrtiorzs

We analyze the effectiveness of probabilistic packet marking
for IP traceback under DoS attack. Our technical contributions
are two-fold.
First, we define the source identification problem
probleni in the
framework of probabilistic packet marking (PPM) and present
a comprehensive analysis of its properties. We show that PPM
is vulnerable to spoofing of the marking field in the IP header
by the attacker which can impede traceback by the victim. We
show that there is a trade-off
trade-off relation between the ability of the
victim to localize the attacker and the severity of the DoS atattack, which is a function of the marking probability, path length,
and traffic volume. The optimal decision problem-the
problem-the victim
can choose the marking probability and the attacker chooses the

spoofed marking value, source address, and attack volumevoluniecan be expressed as a constrained minimax optimization problem:
marking probability such that the
lem: the victim selects the niarking
number of forgeable attack paths is minimized and the attacker
chooses the traffic volume and marking value to maximize uncertainty.
certainty. We show that the attacker's ability to hide his location
is curtailed by increasing the marking probability, however,
however. the
degree to which the victim can delimit the attacker's
attacker's injection
of uncertainty is bounded by sampling constraints. In particular, the attacker, by choosing a minimal attack traffic volume,
can amplify the nuniber
number of equally likely forged attack paths to
d
d--1, independent of the victim's choice of marking probability,
where d is the path length. In IP internetworks with hop count
25 or less (as is the case on the Internet) and attack volume in
the thousands of packets-to
packets-to qualify as a DoS attack, the victim's resources must be nontrivially taxed-we
taxed-we show that the
attacker's address can be localized to within 2-5
2-5 equally likely
sites which renders PPM effective against single source attacks.
Second, we analyze the consequences of the attacker mounting distributed DoS attacks where each partaking attack host
transmits a minimal traffic volume to maximize anonymity, and
attack volume amplification is achieved by engaging a large
number
nuniber of sources. We show that for a given attack volume, by
mounting a distributed denial of service attack, the uncertainty
injected into IP traceback can be amplified above and beyond
the effect afforded by distributedness. Thus PPM, while effective against single-source attacks, is potentially vulnerable when
subject to distributed DoS attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as foJJows.
follows. In the next
section,
section: we give a summary of related works. In Section Ill,
111:
we discuss the core issues surrounding source identification and
define the IP traceback problem in the framework of PPM. In
Section IV, we present the analysis of single-source DoS attack
which is complemented by numerical evaluations using Internet
related parameters. In Section V we study the distributed DoS
case and show its detrimental consequences on PPM. We conclude with a discussion of our results.

II.

RELATED WORK

Several types of DoS attacks have been identified [2], [4],
(41, [6],
[6]:
[7]
[7] with the most basic DoS attack demanding more resources
than the target system or network can supply. Resources may
be network bandwidth, file system space, processes,
processes: or network
connections [6].
(61. While host-based DoS attacks are more easily
traced and managed, network-based DoS attacks which exploit
TCPIIP protocol suite [17],
[17], represent a more
weaknesses of the Tep/IP
subtle and challenging threat [6],
[6]: [9].
[9]. Network-based DoS attacks, by default. employ spoofing to forge the source address
of DoS packets to hide the identity of the physical source [8].
[8].
Previous works have focused on detecting DoS attacks and mitigating their detrimental impact upon the victim
19], [20].
victiin [18],
[ I 81, [[19],
[21].
[21]. This approach does not eliminate the problem, nor does
it deter potential attackers.
attackers. As a means of preventing networkbased DoS attacks,
attacks, edge filtering in border gateways has been
proposed for limiting IP source address spoofing [22],
[22]. [23],
[24]. The filtering rules can affect dropping of forged packets
filtering
using egress filtering in user organizations and ingress filtering

in ISPs [2],
[2], [25].
[25].
A number of recent works have studied source identification
(also called IP traceback in [9]) which span a range of techniques with their individual pros and cons. In link testing, the
physical source of an attack is identified by tracing it back hopby-hop through the network [II].
[I I]. Traceback is typically performed manually and recursively repeated at the upstream router
until the originating host is reached. The drawbacks of link testing include multiple branch points, slow traceback during an
attack, communication
overhead due to message exchange,
con~n~unication
exchange, and
administrative constraints between network operators including
legal issues [1
[I I]. The audit trail approach facilitates tracing via
traffic logs at routers and gateways [(121,
12], [14], [26]. This method
is conducive to off-line traceback of DoS attacks. A principal
however, is the high storage and processing overweakness, however?
head incurred at routers-which
routers-which are expected to switch at Tbps
rates-which
rates-which can exert a significant burden. In behavioral monitoring,
itoring, the likely behavior of an attacker during a DoS attack is
monitored to identify the source [6]. For example,
example, an attacker
may perform DNS requests to resolve the name of the target host
which may not be resident in its local name server's cache. During a DoS attack, an attacker may try to gauge the impact of the
attack using various service requests including Web and ICMP
echo requests. Thus, logging of such events and activities can
reveal information about the attacker's source. In packet-based
traceback, packets are marked with the addresses of intermediate routers, in some sense, an inverse operation of source routing
and similar to the IP Record Route option [27].
(271. The victim uses
information inscribed in packets to trace the attack back to its
source. A related method is generating information packetspacketsseparate from data packets-that
packets-that convey analogous path information as ICMP traceback messages to the victim [10].
ination
[lo]. In both
methods, overhead in the form of variable-length marking fields
that depend on path length or traffic overhead due to extra messaging packets are incurred.
incurred.

Fig.
an attacker can forge a path that is equally likely as the
Fig. ILl.
11.1. In PPM.
PPM.an
Ihe true attack path by transmitting
transmitting corrupted packets that reach the victim untouched
(i.e.,
(i.e..unmarked).

Probabilistic packet marking [9], [13], [15]
[I51 achieves the best
of both worlds-space
worlds-space efficiency in the form of constant marking field and processing efficiency
efficiei~cyin the form of minimal router
support-at
support-at the expense of introducing uncertainty due to probabilistic sampling of a flow's path. The latter has two important,
and opposing,
opposing. effects: (a)
(a) discovery of con'ect
correct path information
by sampling which aids the victim's
victinl's objective of traceback, and
(b)
(b) injection of corrupted information by the attacker. In the
latter, with a certain probability a packet-however
packet-however formatted

untouched, which can imby the attacker-will
attacker-will travel through i~ntouched.
pede the victim's ability to identify the true attack path. This is
illustrated in Figure ILl.
11.1. More generally, the number of forgeable paths that are from an information-theoretic point-of-view
indistinguishable with respect to their validity from the true attack path can further render source identification difficult if their
[9]: issue (a)
(a) was analyzed yielding a parnumbers are large.
large. In [9],
tial and,
and, perhaps, overly optimistic evaluation of probabilistic
packet marking as a DoS prevention method. The principal contribution of [9]
[9] lies in the investigation of coding issues aimed
at further reducing the (constant)
(constant) marking
rnarking bits needed in the IP
header via fragmentation. The IP option field is another possible candidate for implementing marking field coding. In this
(b)-the attacker's ability to
paper, we study the critical issue (b)-the
inject misleading information-and
information-and give a comprehensive analysis of the effectiveness of PPM under single-source and disnumerical evaluations.
tributed DoS attacks, complemented by nun~erical
We remark that PPM is not perfect and suffers under two additional weaknesses (they are not unique to PPM, however, and
are shared by the other approaches). First. PPM is reactive in
the sense that damage must occur before corrective actionsactionsincluding source identification-can
identification-can be underlaken
undertaken by the victim. Second,
Second: PPM does not scale well under
i~nderdistributed DoS
(DDoS)
(DDoS) attacks in the sense that the more hosts an attacker
is able to compromise and use as a distributed attack site, the
greater the effort needed (approximately proportional) to identify the attack sites. Route-based distributed packet filtering
[28]
filtering [28]
is a new approach which, in addition to matching the power of
PPM,
PPM: solves its weaknesses including the need to have a marking field.
field.
III.
PACKET
AND
111. PROBABILISTIC
PROBABILISTIC
PACKETMARKING
MARKING
A N D TRACEBACK
TRACEBACK

A. Network Model

G = (V,
(I.;..E)
E) where
The network is given as a directed graph G
V
1.' is the set of nodes and E
E is the set of edges. l'
1.. can be further
(internal
partitioned into end systems (leaf nodes) and routers (internal
nodes). The edges denote physical links between elements in
17.
1,'. Let 5
S C VI,' denote the set of attackers and let tt E VV \\ 5S
victirn. We will first consider the case when 151
IS1 = 11
denote the victim.
(single-source attack) and treat the distributed DoS attack case
I, and
separately.
separately. We assume that routes are fixed
fixed',

2
comprised of d(1 routers (or hops) Vl
vl ....
. . . . ,. Vd,
u d : and of path length
length2
d is called an attack ppath.
E, U
E 'F
A, with destination
a t l ~ .A path U:
# A:
forgeable path.
(u'F
# s)
s ) is called aa.for-genble
node tt and source node uu (u

B. Probabilistic Markillg
B.I
B. 1 Definition

Let Iv'
-h: denote the number of packets sent from
froin s to t.t. We will
leave the time duration or interval unspecified (typically N
-hi »
>>
11 and DoS attacks occur over a concentrated time period). A
1' 0On
1 1 the
tlle IP Internet. the majority
majorily of TCP
TCP sessions do not experience
experience route
changes during their connection lifetime.
lifelime. Generalization
Generalization of PPM under dynamic
routing (the
process must be specified)
routin:
(Ihr routing pl-ocess
specified) is a problem for future
future work.
of generality. we
modified definition
2Without
'Without loss
lossof
ule use a slightly
sliphtly niodifird
delinition of path length
which counts the number of intermediate hops for notational convenience.
u~hicli
convenience.

10,------------------,

a
3
~
sai(p)

2

d=10
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d=25

I
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/

P

o f:c----:-a
0.2

- - - , - - , - - -"_
'_-----j

0.4

0.6

o.a

1p

aI(p) as a function
p. Right:
(p) /2..:;
(p) as a function
Fig. 111.1. Left: c>o(p)/
ao(p)/01(p)
function of
ol'p
Risht: ao
ao(p)/
C7a;
a,(p)
function of
o f TJp for d =
= 10.
10. 25.
'25

marking field where the identity
packet .r
s is assumed to have a mcrrkingjeld
of a link (v,
(v! Vi)
v') E E
E traversed can be inscribed. A packet travels
on the attack path A sequentially. At a hop Vi
vi E {VI,
{ v l : . . . :,Vd},
vd),
packet x is marked with the edge value (v
i-I,
packets
(vil , Vi),
v,), i = 1,
1.. . . ,d,
. d,
with probability p (0 ::::: p ::::: 1)
s. This process is
1) where va
vo =
= s.
called probnbilistic
probabilistic marking.
If a packet s
x was already marked
~nc~rking.
by a previous router,
router: a new mark will replace or overwrite the
old one. Let .7:x jj,: j =
= 0,
0 , 11,, ...
. . . ,d
! d denote the value of the marking
XI,
X 2 , ...
field at node Vi.
vi. Let X
I !XS:.
. . ,X
. X dd be a set of i.i.d. binary
random variables where Pr{X
Pr{Xii = 1}
1) = p, Pr{X
P r { S ii = O}
0) =
11 --p,p, and X
Xii = 11 indicates that marking
marlung was performed at node
Vi.
Xo is under the control of the attacker who determines the
vi. .zto
x j is a random variable depend
ing
initial marking value. Thus .ztj
depending
X j, X j --lI. •...
on Sj,
. . . ,. X
X II and :fO,
:ro, and we will be interested in the
Xd.
behavior of xd.

< <

B.2 Path Sampling

Let O:i
ai(p)
(p) denote the probability that the arriving packet at the
victim is lastly marked at node Vi
vi but nowhere after Vi.
vi. Thus
O:i(P)

= Pr{Xd = (Vi-I, Vi)} = p(l- p)d-i.

The probability that a packet sent from the attacker reaches the
victim without being marked at any of the routers is o:o(p)
ao(p) =
=
(1
( 1 -- p)d
p)d. As with IP source address spoofing,
spoofing, the attacker may
choose to inscribe a value zXoo which serves the purpose of hiding the attacker's identity. When N
A; packets are transmitted, the
expected number of packets reaching target t marked with the
edge value (Vi(vi- t1 ,, Vi)
vi) is ni (p)
(p) =
= N aO:i, (p).
(p). Note that

and to receive a marked packet from Vv lI containing the first Iink
link
a lI (p).
value (s,
(s! Vv I)
l ) requires IV
-A: :::::
>_ 1/
l/a
(p). Since N
A; (the attack volume) is a variable under the attacker's control,
control: from a purely
sampling point-of-view, edge (s,
( s ,Vvd
l ) is the "weakest
"weakest link" requiring the most samples
san~ples(i.e.,
(i.e.: packet transmissions) to recover
the attack path. The expected number of samples
sanlples needed to receive marked packets from all routers requires a logarithmic cor(const.·In
I11 d)
d )/0:
/ a I1 (p).
(p). This
rection term, and is bounded above by (const
follows
folIows from the disjointness of O:i(P)
a i ( p ) and an application of the

coupon collector's problem using the relaxed probability 0:
a I (p),
(p);
which yields the well-known solution dln
tlln d + Old).
O(d). This has
also been noted in [9].
(91.

+

B.3 Marking Field Spoofing
When N
A; packets are sent in the course of a DoS attack,
attack. the
attackercanexpectno(p)
N(l-p)d
packetscontainingthe
attacker can expect no(p) =
= .A:(1
- p)"ackets
containing the
attacker's inscribed value T
XoO to reach the target untouched. By
"corrupting"
"corrupting" the marking field-in
field-in addition to spoofing the IP
source address-the
address-the attacker may adversely impact the path reconstruction capability of the victim based on the IV
A' packets received. The larger the fraction of corrupted marking field packets, the more damage the attacker can exact. What values to
<u;hieve maxinium
maximum effect is treated in the next secinscribe to aghieve
tion. With respect to the weakest point V],
v l : we are interested in
the p values
vaIues for which

*
*

no(p)
no (P) :::::
> ndp)
nl (P)

¢:}
¢:}

o:o(p):::::
NO (P) 1 adp)
01(12)
(1
p)d
_ p)d-'
p)d-I
( 1 - p)" ::::: pp(l
(1 -

(III.!)
(111.1)

<

p ::::: 1/2.
which has the solution
solutionp
112. That is,
is: if
i fpp :::::
5 1/2
112 then spoofed
packets will arrive more than true packets marked with the link
value (s,
(s: vvt).
l ) . In general, we may consider the case
d

o:o(p) :::::

L O:i(P)

¢:}

(1 - p)d ::::: 1 - (1 - p)d

(III.2)

i=1

where the corrupted packets are in the absolute majority which
I d
/ . For example, for d = 10,
holds for p ::::: 11 -- 22-'Id.
10: the inequality holds if p ::::: 0.067. Figure 111.1
111.1 (left) shows the ratio
o:o(p)/o:]
a o ( p ) / a l (p)
(p) as a function of p, and Figure III.l
111.1 (right) shows
0:0
25.
a o ((p)
p )// Li O:i
a i ((p)
p ) as a function of yp for d =
= 10.
10.25.
N, d,
Whereas A;,
d, and sXoo are under the attacker's control, the
marking probability is a system parameter and,
and: thus, the purview
d, and s
of the victim. The optimal selection of IV:
I"i, d,
Xooby the attacker, and correspondingly
correspondingIy optimal selection of p by the victacker.
tim to achieve their individual, conflicting objectives lies at the
heart of the probabilistic PPM approach to source identification.
In practice, we assume that an overall agreed-upon,
agreed-upon: effective p
value would be implemented
implen~entedat the routers.

<

xi

<

of the attacker is to maximize 171,
112: whereas the objective of the
victim is to minimize 171.
optin~izationproblem for
nz. A minimax optimization
the attacker and victim can be formulated as follows:
follows:

< G)G)"@

8%'
V

J

~

-

-

-

min
lnin max
ma.x m(p.
m ( p . .xo)
TO)
P
p

atrack
path
au~k~ili

:co
"0

(111.5)
(111.5)

subject to (IlIA)
(111.4)

forgeable
path:
-- fOJ
geabk path~

-

~

~

~

where the maximum is over all distributions of rXoo viewed as a
random variable. The minimax fonnulation
formulation biases toward the
victim.
victim. The formulation in (111.5)
(111.5) does not incorporate the atattack volume -&:
]\i and thus unduly favors
favors the victim. A sampling
constraint is added by requiring

>

Fig..IJJ.2.
. . .. ,Vd,t)
Fig. 111.2. Attack path (S,Vj,V2,
(s: ui:un..
.z:,,: l ) and a sct
scl ofm
of nz forgeable
forgeable paths
(11;,
Vj
, ...
joined at
Vj .
(u,.
ul:.
. . ,: Vd,
c d : 1),
1 ) . ;i =
=L
1 . ..
. . ,. . nm.
l . joined
ar vl

Consider an attacker with attack path A = (s.
(s. 1)z.I . . . . ,1)d.
, v d . t)
and forgeable paths B; =
VI
m,, at
= (11;.
(ui.
?:I......
. . .. Ud.
tld. t),
t). i = 1.
1.. . . . m
d, joined
joined at vl
Vj forming the (caterpillar) subgraph shown
distance
distanced,
in Figure I1I.2.
111.2. This particular attack pattern is of interest (i)
because it targets the "weakest" point of probable path recovery by the victim according to (111.1).
(111.1). (ii)
(ii) attacker ss can generate packets that, unless marked at VI,
1 : ' ; will be indistinguishable from real packets originating at 11;
u and arriving at t,
t: (iii)
other attack configurations can be analyzed using the tools developed for the caterpillar subgraph, and (iv) the concepts underlying optimal decision making by both attacker and victim
are easily brought out. The traceback problem in a caterpillar graph is a special case of the traceback problem in general topologies, which is discussed in the full paper [I].
[ I ] . One
of the three decision variables-the
variables-the attacker's marking field
spoof variable xo-can
.TO--can be fixed by the following informationtheoretic argument. Let nf(p)
izg(p) be the number of spoofed packets arriving at t with the marking field containing (11;.
( u i ,VI
V I).) . AsASsume no(p)
izo(p) = 2:::'1 nf(p).
nf(p). That is,
isl all packets transmitted by
the attacker are inscribed with spoofing values from the link set
{(11;,vd:
m}.lfitholdsthat
{ ( u , vl)
~ ! : ii =
= 1,2,
1:2 , ....
. . . .nz).
If it holds that

Cyil

(I1I.3)
= nf(p) = nHp) = ... = n~n(P)'
all m
the
nz +
t 11 paths are equally
e q ~ ~ a llikely-i.e.,
1ikelyi.e..
lj

then by (ii)
attack could have been undertaken from any of the nodes
s,
s ! 11.1,112,
u , ~u?!.
: ...
. . . 11.
u,,,
m yielding the same outcome in terms of collected marking values at t.
t . Of course, by the probabilistic nature of the marking process, exact equality cannot be expected
to hold. Instead, if the marginal densities can be equated

.

min max
inax m(p,
m ( p . xo)
p

= af(p) = a~(p) = ... = a~ll(p),

(III.7)
(111.7)

-Yis incorporated as part of the attacker's decision
Note that ]\;
variable due to constraint (111.6).
(111.6). lVadp)
fial (p) as a function of p
has a unimodal (or bell) shape with peak at pp =
= lid.
l l d . Thus
decreasing A;
]V can shrink the size of the feasible region defined
by (I1I.6).
(111.6).
IV
DoS
ATTACK
IV. ANALYSIS
A N A L Y S IOF
OSF SINGLE-SOURCE
SINGLE-SOURCE
DoS ATTACK
This section analyzes PPM under single-source DoS attacks.
attacks.
We first derive performance bounds for the minimax optimization problem, and then give numerical evaluations using Internet
related parameters that complement the analytical results.
results.

A. Minimax Optimiz.ation

A necessary condition for (IlIA)
(111.4) to hold is that when transmitting a packet, the attacker inscribes spoofed link values with
unifonn probability, i.e.,
11
Pr{xo
P 1 . { ~ =o =(11;,Vl)}
( u 2 , v 1 )=) =m-,,
m

i ==11.. 22•...
. . . . :,m.
nz.

(lVl)
(IV.1)

Condition (IV])
re(IV.1) can be further derandomized-i.e.,
derandomized-i.e.,
placed by a deterministic procedure that emulates uniform
generation-if
generation-if information contained in the sequential arrival of
marked/spoofed packets is not considered. In conjunction with
marked/spoofed
(IV
(IV. I), a necessary and sufficient condition for (IlIA)
(111.4) is

= ao(p)

¢}

mp(l- p)d-l

¢}

1
m=--l
p

(IlIA)

entropy is maximal, and by symmetry, each of the nodes
{s,
{s. 11
u 1,112
l . 7 1 2•, .. .. ..•, 11u,,,)
m } is an equally likely candidate. We will call
m-a
m-a function of p and spoofing variable xo-the
zo-the uncertainty
~rncertaing.
factor with respect to marking probability p. For a formal deffnctor
inition of the "indistinguishability notion,"
notion." we refer the reader
to [I]. In the context of traceback,
traceback. the uncertainty factor 171
~ i zis
the objective function for measuring the effectiveness of traceback. The larger 171
nz is,
is. the more the processing cost incurred by
Thus. the objective
the victim to trace back the attack source. Thus,

",o,/V
r0:N

subject to (IlIA)
(111.4) and (I1I.6).
(111.6).

17W1(P)

adp)

(Ill.
6)
(111.6)

Thus
Tliirs the refined minimax optimization reflecting the victim's
sampling constraint is given by

C.
Problem
C. Traceback Problein

ndp)

Na] (p)
Np(l -- p)d-'
p)d-l 2: 1.
-&;a,
(p) =
= I\ip(l
1.

= (1 _ p)d
(lV2)

That is,
is? given p (determined by the victim), the attacker can
achieve an uncertainty factor of m
m = (lip)
( l l p ) -- 1,
1. Thus 171
in =
=
(lip)
( l l p ) -- 11 is the maximal
inax-bml uncertainty factor satisfying (lIlA)
(111.4) for
a given
p. Without the sampling constraint (1II.6),
givenp.
(III.6), the victim can
affect
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4

8

N=200

/'
3 (\
n,(p)

/N=IOO

I \~

N=200

!-r-------- ---

21. V
\
\
/N=26

2/
I

/

"-

-

1

_

a-'-.----,-0.~2----==0~.4~--,0~.6---,0.~8-~

N=IOO
N=67

~
a~---,-0~.2~-0-,.4--~0~_6---,0.~8--.--j
p

p

Fie. IVI.
1V.l. Left:
L e l ~ ,.,nl
: 1 (p)
(p) as a function
fi~nctionof p for N = 26,100_
26.100. and 200 when d = 10.
10. Right: Corresponding plol
= 25.
25.
Fig.
plot when d =

<

= 1 is disallowed-necessary
disallo~~ed-necessary for
since 0O <:: p < 1.
1. Since p :=
2probabilistic path discovery when the hop count d is at least 2we have
m:=(Ilp)-I'),O

as

p)'1.

'The uncertainty factor achievable by the attacker becomes null
The
m being an integer representing the in-degree of router
since, m
v l : only
0 1 1 1 ~L
Lm]
(111.6) conVI,
m J matters. With the sampling constraint (III.6)
straining the victim from choosing p arbitrarily close to I, we
need to compute the min-max over the feasible region
L := {(P: lY) : Np(I - p)d-l ::::: I}

defined by (III.6)
(111.6) where L is parameterized by the attack disd. It can be checked that for all d ::::: 2, L is convex in p.
tance d.
Thus the feasible region L defined by both the attacker and victim's moves is a union of convex sets L.4;
L.rv (the set L keeping the
2 .KO
=A
.No
To (d)
(d)
N) for .A
N; :::::
No where K
NoO :=
second coordinate fixed at .A:)
number-a function of d-such
d-such that (p,
( p !N
o ) E L for
is the least number-a
No)

>

some
p.
somep.

>

Tlzeorern I: For all d ::::: 2,
2. Ln;
Theorem
L.rv is convex. Furthermore,

>

L.vf
i f lV'
K 1 :::::
2K
L N , 2 L.4,
L.rv if
N..

CorollaJ)'
N :=
I(d _1)d-l
Corolla~yI: If
If A;
= dd
d"(d
1)"-' then m*
m' :=
= d -- 1.
1.
Thus the attacker, by judiciously choosing the attack volume,
volume.
1. Since dd
d"(d
I(dcan maximally hide his identity given by d -- 1.
11)"'
)d-I IX
cx d,
d, this occurs at a drastic cost in reduced attack volume
volun~e
which may
inay fail to affect significant "denial of service"
service" at the
attack.
target. thus taking the bite out of the attack.

B. Approximation of
of Uncertainty
Uricertainty Fcrctor
Factor

>

To find
find a feasible region of p for l\;p(I
K p ( 1 -- pp)d-l
) d - l > 1,
1, we
need to solve the equation IVp(1
Np(I -- p)"-'
p)d-l :=
= 1.
1. This equation
is transformed to the polynomial zx'"n -- X"z7'-'1 + c by substitution
n, respectively. It is not possible.
of p.
p, -W.
N, d with 1 -- 2
x,, 1l /I cc,, n,
possible,
however. to factor the polynomial with c :=
= 1l /IN
A ; to find its roots.
however,
Also,
Also. there are no known formulae for the roots of polynomials
[30].Therefore, we derive approximate sowith degree n ::::: 5 [30].
lutions for the minimax optimization problem in addition to the
qualitative results derived in the previous section.
Without loss of generality, we divide .Aip(l
Np(I -- p)"-'
p)d-l :=
= 1 by
.W. and represent p as 1 -- zx (0
( 0 <:: zx <:: 1).
1 ) . Thus, the equation
N,
becomes
d-I
11
( 1 - z)zd-'
=(I-x)x
:=
N.

+

>

< <

n;

'

Assuming N
justified by N
fi »
>> 1 which is justified
il: denoting the attack
volun~eof DoS, the right-hand-side becomes
z
0. Thus, the
volume
~ O.
solution is close to 0 or 1.
1 . First, consider the case where a root
is close to 1.
1. The exponential term will be close to I,
1, yielding
= 1 -- 1l /IN.
f i . For this value of z:
x, the
the approximate solution zx :=
exponential term on the left-hand-side becomes (1
( 1 -- liN)
1 / M ) d-I.
d-'.
Theorem
Theorern 2: Let m.
m.'* be the solution of the constrained miniK -+
+
co. For example, its value is
This term approaches 1 as N
00.
(111.7).Then m.
m *' <:: d -- 1.
1.
max problem given by (111.7).
5
0.99976 when N :=
and d :=
= 10
lo5
= 25,
25. which is small compared
to
unity.
Thus,
we
arrive
at an approximation to the root.
Theorem 2 shows that the maximum achievable uncertainty
~~ncertainty
factor-i.e.,
paths-cannot exceed d -- 1,
Next. consider the case when the root is close to O.
factor-i.e., equally likely forged paths-cannot
1:
0. The term
the distance between the attacker and victim. Thus the farther
( 1 -- rx)) will be close to I, and may be neglected. The equation
(1
I
the attack site from
froin the target,
target, the more uncertainty can be in- :r
r"'d - 1 :=
= liN
1 / N gives an approximate solution rx :=
= $ d=1.
& . The
I1
[29]:most path lengths are bounded by
jected. On the Internet [29],
= d=1
d-l is close to 0
O for large N
:Y so that (1
( 1 -- .1')
m) ~
= 1.1.
25,
25. and thus this puts an upper bound on the effectiveness of
of value of rx :=
I
single-source DoS attacks when subject to probabilistic packet
1 - (I/-l\i)
(l/-A;)or d=1,
zi : the correThus, since zx is approximately 1II
marking. An immediate consequence of Theorem 2 is the foll / A ; or 1 -- d=1.
=. Therefore, p is approximately
sponding p is liN
lowing corollary which shows that d -- 1 can be tight.
san~plingconstraint
in the following region for satisfying the sampling

*'&

Theorem II shows that the minimax problem can be viewed as
a sequence of convex minimization problems of the objective
(lip) -- lover
1 over L.4;
= K
O ,N
1 , ....
. . . . Thus
L.rv for -A;
N :=
No,
Noo + 1,
function (lip)
there is a unique solution. The next result gives a performance
bound on the attacker's ability to hide his identity under PPM.
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Fig. lY.2.
IV.2. Left: Upper bound of marking probability
appl.oximalion as a function
lunction of d for .TV
.h7 =
= 10l,
ld: 10
l o 55 ,10
: 10'.7 . Right: Upper bound of pp as a function of
Fig.
probability p and its approximation
.hi (i.e
(i.e..
logaritli~ll)for
fol- d =
= 5,
5: 10,
10: 15,
15: 20. and 25.
25.
.TV
.. its logarithm)

]Vp(l - p)d-l ::;. 1:

Hence,
Hence. the maxilllulll
maximum uncertainty value 111
712 of the min-max optimization problem is given by

111:::::-------;-1 - ]\;'- d~'
5
When AIV
and d =
.; = 10.
10h11d
= 25,
25, the uncertainty factor 111
m is apap1.6247. When IV
-W=
= 10
lo77 and d = 25,111
25: m is further
proximated by 1.6247.
reduced to 1.0446.
1.0446. From the approximate analysis of the maximally
imaIly attainable uncertainty factor,
factor: we conclude that choosing
a maximum allowable p by a victim results in the limited ability of an attacker to hide his identity (e.g., 111
7 n = 1 rv 2 when
7
n; = 10
l o 55 rv 10
107).
IV
).

-

-

C. Numerical Eval~ratiorz
C.
Evaluation
In this section, we give numerical solutions to (111.7)
(111.7) that
complen~entthe bounding results and the approximate solutions
complement
given in the previous sections.

C. 1 Marking Probability
Probability
Cl
Probabilistic marking with respect to its encoding using the IP
header's
header's fragmentation field can be efficiently implemented using code distribution over multiple packets. We refer the reader
[9] for a discussion.
to [9]
measure
n 1l (p)
( p ) ::;.
2 1 for
First we meas
ure the range of p which satisfies n
-A' and d.
d . Figure IVl
IV. I (left) shows nn 1I (p)
(p)=
different values of IV
p(l -- p)d-lfi
p)d-l IV as a function of p for IV =
p(1
= 26,100, and 200
10. The allowable range of p
when d = 10.
p (i.e., the set Lni)
L N) is the
nl1 (p)
(p) become larger than l.
1. This can be
region where values of n
discerned by the intersection of nnl1 (p)
( p ) with the constant line I.I .
discemed
graph: the upper bound of p is minimized at lid
l l d = 0.1
0.1
For this graph,
10
M = 10
1010/99
z 26. As ]\1
IV decreases, the upper bound of p
with IV
/9 9 :::::
decreases until IV
I(d -- l)d-l.
X reaches to dd
d"(d
I)"-'. Figure IVI
1V.I (right)
shows the corresponding graphs when d = 25.

Figure IV2
IV.2 (left) shows the feasible range of p as a function
l o 33,10
. l o 55,10
. l o 77,, and their approximations. The
of d when A
N: = 10
approxin~ationis close to the solution. In
plots show that our approximation
K increases,
increases. the approximation becomes tighter,
particular, as IV
especially, for d large.
large. The upper graphs represent the upper
bounds of
o f pp which correspond to the minimax solution of (111.7),
(III.7)?
and the bottom graphs are of the feasible region L
N which are
L,v
increases, the upper bound of
near zero. We observe that as d increases,
p decreases. Since the Internet has a bounded diameter, the
"high" values yielding uncertainty
p stays at "high"
upper bound of p
m = (lip)
( l l p ) -- 1 that are commensurately "low."
"low." Figfactors 111
factors
ure IV2
IV.2 (right) shows the minimax solution as a function of
traffic volume tv'
A; (i.e., its logarithm log IV)
N) for IV
N in the range
lo77 when d = 5,
5: 10,
10. 15,
15. 20,
20: and 25. We observe that to
100 rv 10
reduce the minimax value of p and thus increase the uncertainty
factor 111,
m, the attack volume needs to be decreased exponentially
which is a high penalty to pay in a DoS attack.
N

C2
C.2 Attack Distance
Let us consider the range of forgeable paths when d = 25,
25,
since few paths on the Internet exceed that distance [29]. In the
N = 10
l o 55,,the marking probability p must be in the range
case of IV
4
10-" < P
p < 0.3536 to satisfy the sampling constraint. For
0.1 x 100.1
m is shown in Figthis range, the number of forgeable paths 111
ure IV3
IV.3 (left). While the uncertainty factor 111
m lies in the range
m < 10
l o 55, :a victim can reduce 111
m to 2 by choosing the max1 < 111
0.35. When we increase IV
-Wto 10
l o 77 ,, P
p is
p, i.e., p = 0.35.
imal feasible p,
6
in the range of 0.1
p < 0.4729,
0.4729, and its correspond0.1 x 10- < P
ing value of 111
m is shown in Figure IV3
IV.3 (left).
(left). From the above
instances, we observe that even though PPM cannot pinpoint
the attack host's location, the number of possible candidates is a
manageable constant which can help facilitate on-line traceback
and increase the deterrent factor.
factor.
Let us
LIS consider the effect of the attacker's location to the
traceback. As shown in Figure IV2,
IV.2: as d increases, the updecreases. which increases the uncertainty factor
per bound of p decreases,
111.
In. Given ]\1,
K ,as distance d decreases, the expected number of
spoofed packets, IV
-A,: s , will increase for any given value of p. We
note: however,
however: that the ability of an attacker to hide the attack
note,
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IS
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dI

:s

lil

3D
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25 and .TV
.\: =
= 1105.
l o 77.. Right:
Risht: The
The least
least attack
attack volume lV
3' needed to
10 satisfy the
the
Fig.
d =
tY . 10
Fig. IV3.
IV.3. Left:
Left: The
The lower
lower bound of forgeable
forfeablr: paths
pailis m
m as
as a function
ft~nctionof pp for
ford
= 25
sampling
s a m p l i n constraint (lll.6).
(111.6).

location is
is not in
in proportion to
to the
the number of spoofed packets
packets
received by the
the victim.
victim. Conversely,
Conversely. as
as dd increases,
increases, while the
the
number of spoofed packets received
received by a victim decreases,
decreases, the
the
uncertainty factor
factor m
m increases,
increases, Therefore. when the
the source
source of an
an
attack is
more potent
is far
far from
from the
the victim, the attacker
attacker becomes more
at
at impeding
impeding traceback.
traceback. Since
Since the distance
distance between an
an attacker
and
and victim
victim is
is bounded on
on the
the Internet
Internet. an
an attacker has
has limited
limited
ability to
to hide
hide his
his location
location when subject to
to probabilistic packet
marking.
marking.
C.3
C.3 Attack
Attack Volume
Volume
For
reconstrtlction on
on the
the victim
victim side,
side. IV
For the
the purpose of
of path reconstruction
needs
d-l to
needs to
to be
be at
at least
least dd
d d/ /(d
( d -- 1)
l)d-'
to satisfy
satisfy the
the sampling
sampling conconstraint
straint. Figure
Figure IV.3
IV.3 (right)
(right) shows
shows the
the sampling
sampling lower
lower bound
bound on
on
N
.R; when
when dd =
= 22 ~ 30.
30. As
AS IV
-Vincreases.
increases. the
the victim
victim can
can reduce
reduce
the
the number of forgeable
forgeable paths to
to less
less than d -- 1.
1. Therefore,
Therefore. if
an
an attacker
attacker transmits
transmits a small
small number of packets near the
the samsampling lower bound,
bound. the
the victim
victim will
will additionally
additionally suffer under a
sampling
sampling problem.
problem. This
This points
points toward the fact
fact that amplified
confusion can be
be achieved by mounting
lnountlng distributed DoS
DoS attacks
attacks
where
where each
each attack
attack host
host contributes
contributes aa small
small fraction
fraction of
of the
the total
total
attack
attack volume.
volume.

-

Figure
Figure IVA
IV.4 shows
shows the minimax solution of uncertainty factor
as
N. The
as a joint function
function of d and
and log
log!V.
The value
value of In
7n,is
is plotted
7
for
and
10'1 ::;
5 }\I
i
Y ::;5 10
lo7
and 2 ::;
5 dd ::;5 30.
30. As
As noted earlier,
earlier: an
all
for 10
increase
increase in
in d leads
leads to
to an
an increase
increase in
in m.
772. Whereas
Whereas the
the impact of
d is
is gradual-in
gradual-in fact,
fact: linear
linear (i.e.,
(i.e.. upper bounded by d -- 1),
1): the
the
impact
impact of tli
!Y is
is more pronounced.
pronounced. With a small
small attack volume.
e.g.,
e.g., I\i
i\,- =
= 10
10 ~ 100,
100: an
an attacker can keep the
the victim at an
an
uncertainty level
level approaching
approaching 20.
20. As
As N
N increases
increases to
to tv' = 10
l o 33 ~
5
10
, however,
lo5:
however. m
i-rz can achieve
achieve values only in
in the
the range 11~ 44 even
at
at d = 25.
25. This
This means
means that a victim can effectively localize
localize the
the
physical source
source of
of an
an attack
attack to
to 22 ~ 55 candidates.
candidates. This
This makes
makes
itit intrinsically
DoS attacker
attacker to
to wreck
wreck havoc
havoc using
intrinsically difficult
difficult for
for aa DoS
single-source
single-source attacks
attacks when
when PPM
PPM isis employed
employed by
by the
the network
network to
to
facilitate
facilitate traceback.
traceback. Of
Of course.
course, itit isis unrealistic
unrealistic to
to assume
assume that
that
pp can
can be
be programmed by
by different
different users
users to
to suit
suit their
their individual
individual
needs.
needs. The
The small
small constant
constant upper bound
bound on
on In
Tn admits
admits the
the policy
of setting
w n c e and
and for
for all-for
all-for a sufficiently
sufficiently large
large distance
distance d
setting p----Dnce
and
and conservative
conservative attack volume
volume N
A; which renders single-source
single-source
traceback practically feasible.
feasible.
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V.
V. DISTRIBUTED
D ~ S T R ~ B U TDoS
E D ATTACK
ATTACK

A.
A. Key
Kej' Issues

Given
Given the
the theoretically
theoretically and
and practicaJly
practically bounded
bounded impact
impact of
of
single-source
DoS attack
attack under
under probabilistic
probabilistic packet marking,
marking,
single-source DoS
distributed
distributed DoS
DoS attacks
attacks present
present aa potentially
potentially important
important dimendimension
sion to
to the
the source
source identification
identification problem.
problem. In
In Section
Section IV
IV we
we
showed
showed that
that the
the uncertainty
uncertainty factor
factor in
in single-source
single-source attack
attack can
can
be
be amplified
amplified up
up to
to 20
20 ifif the
the path length
length isis sufficiently
sufficiently large,
large,
20
however,
however. this
this occurs
occurs at
at the
the cost
cost of
of drastic-i.e.,
drastic-i.e., exponentialexponentialreduction
reduction in
in traffic
traffic volume
volume (cL
(cf. Figure
Figure IVA)
IV.4) which
which may
may render
render
15
the
the attack
attack ineffective
ineffective with
with respect
respect to
to achieving
achieving "denial
"denial of
of serserm10
vice."
vice." Attack
Attack volume
volume may
may be
be recovered
recovered by
by mounting
mounting concurconcurrent,
rent, small
small volume
volume attacks
attacks from
from aa number
number of
of sites,
sites, but
but its
its effieffi5
ciency
ciency needs
needs to
to be
be evaluated
evaluated with
with respect
respect to
to the
the cost
cost of
of mountmounto
ing
ing distributed
distributed attacks
attacks which
which grows
grows with
with the
the number
number of
of hosts
hosts
1
5
engaged
engaged in
in the
the attack.
attack. In
In particular,
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B. Distributed
Distributed DoS Attack Model
Mode!
B. 1 Classification
B.l
The traceback probleni
problem in distributed DoS attacks can be classified into two categories in accordance with the objectives unan!;derlying the attack and its susceptibility to traceback. In anysource traceback,
traceback, the attacker is assumed to be vulnerable to
further traceback once a compromised attack host is identified
(e.g., due to state information left on the host). Thus the attacker
link-i.e., maximize the uncertainty
seeks to fortify the weakest link-i.e.,
host-whereas the victim tries
factor of each individual attack host-whereas
to find a weak attack host. In a11-source
all-source traceback,
traceback, we assume
the attacker is able to mount stateless intrusions when gathering attack hosts, and thus his objective is to maximize total
uncertainty (vs. individual uncertainty in the any-source traceback case) since quick traceback of individual attack hosts does
not present a danger with respect to revealing traceback information. The attacker's objective is to maximize the number of
forged paths that the victim has to process, and the victim's
victim's goal
is to isolate or shut down traffic flow emanating from comprised
hosts.
B.2 Traceback Analysis
An environment for distributed DoS attack is described as folM distinct sources, each source 8i
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v i . 2 . ..
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v i , d ; . t).
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represented by Ai = (8i'
generality, assume d ii :S d jj for ii < j. The expected number
of generality,
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hosts, in a distributed DoS attack, may
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comnlon objective.
actions to achieve a common
In the case of any-source traceback,
traceback: the objective of the attacker is to maximize
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Thus, the any-source
any-source traceback case reduces to the single-source
traceback problem as affected by the definition.
definition.
In the case of all-source traceback, the objective of the attacker lies in maximizing
M

111

= 2::: mi.
;=1

m: an attack host may send spoofed
To affect an increase in m,
packets whose aim is to amplify another attack host's uncertainty factor rather than its own. The objective function can be
further simplified

n.r
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due to its lack of dependence on -Wi
N i and d ii .. Thus the derivation
shows that from the attacker's point-of-view, one way of maxii
m = L;~l 111
mi
mizing 111
is to perform Ad
IvI separate maximizations

c::,

on each attack host. As with the any-source traceback case,
case. alJallsource traceback reduces to the single-source traceback problem
and does not necessitate cooperation among the attack hosts to
achieve maximum
n1axlmun1 uncertainty amplification. When performing
(111.7) on each attack host
the constrained minimax optimization (III.7)
as given by the single-source formulation in Section III,
111. d;
d l and
N; only enter in the 111
!Vi
4 1 constraints corresponding to (I1I.6).
(111.6).
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To measure the (in)effectiveness
(in)effectiveness of traceback in a distributed
DoS attack setting,
setting: we perform comparative evaluation with
single-source attack where the total traffic volume is held constant. As discussed in Section V-A, our aim lies in evaluating
the degree to which distributed DoS attack under probabilistic
packet marking can achieve uncertainty amplification above and
beyond the distribution factor 111
Ad achievable in the trivial case.
Let N
I\; be the total attack traffic volume-the
volume-the same for singlesource attack as well as distributed DoS attack-and
attack-and let ]\i;
-4:; =
1VIM,
Ai, which facilitates comparability.
-V/Al.d,
d , = d,
d. 11 :::: ii :::: -&I,
comparability.
Let 17J.'
j. Then
111,- (.l\i;)
(A;,) be the uncertainty factor achievable by N
A;,.
the ratio m,'
1M) jnl (N)
7 , - (]V
(ll;/lll)/,~l;
(.W)represents the expansion rate to uncertainty factor with respect to the distribution factor 1I-i.
ill. Figure VI
V.1 (left) shows the coefficient of expansion to uncertainty
-distributed attack where 111
~ 500.
amplification in an 111
Ad-distributed
1LI = 11 -500.
As 111
A I increases,
increases: the coefficient of expansion increases,
increases: and
achieves higher gains with small
sniall ]V
-V and small d.
d. This implies
inlplies
that traceback to a single source becomes more difficult as the
attack volume is scattered into smaller units.
·
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actor !11m'
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as a function of AAi.
d . The larger M,
hl:the higher the amplification.
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Thus,
Thus: given an attack volume, as attack sources are distributed,
distributed,
the uncertainty injected into traceback can be amplified beyond
the effect afforded by distribution.
clistribution.
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VI.
VI. CONCLUSION
CONCLUSION

Recently probabilistic packet marking has been proposed for
an DoS attack. While PPM
tracing the source-i.e.,
source-i.e.. origin--of
origin-f
has the advantages of efficiency and implementability
implelnentability over deterministic packet marking and router based
basedlogginglmessaging,
logging/messaging,
it has the potential drawback that an attacker may impede traceback by sending packets with spoofed marking field values as
well as spoofed source IP
1P addresses. This paper analyzed the effectiveness of PPM in a minimax adversarial context where the
attacker is allowed to spoof the marking field to achieve maximum confusion at the victim. Our analysis shows that, while it
is always possible for an attacker to impede exact traceback by
the victim,
victim. the attacker's ability to affect uncertainty is limited
in intemetworks
internetworks with bounded diameters similar to the Internet,
Internet.
when a suitable marking probability is chosen. Thus, for singlesource attacks PPM is effective at localizing the attack origin.
In a distributed DoS attack, however, as the number of attack
sources mounted increases, traceback is rendered more difficult
due to an uncertainty amplification effect above and beyond the
distribution factor M.
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